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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD PAULSEN, WILLARD K.
PAULSEN, NORMAN G. PAULSEX, doing business under the
firm name and style of PAULSEN
BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
CO~fPANY

Plaintiffs,

BRIEF
Case No.
7880

vs.
KENNETH E. COOMBS and LAVERNE H. COOMBS, his wife

Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action grew out of the · alleged violation of
a contract between plaintiffs and defendants whereby
plaintiffs agreed to perform certain carpentry labor
and furnish certain materials in connection with the
construction of the residence of the defendants at 2980
South Connor street, Salt Lake City, Utah, for a total
consideration of $5,500.00 to be paid by the defendants.
The contract, Exhibit A (R. 6-7) which was made a
part of and attached to plaintiffs' complaint, provided
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generally that the plaintiffs agreed to do the carpentry
work including forming of footings and foundations;
framing and structural carpentry work; laying of floors;·
exterior trim; finish and panneling; setting of ground
for plastering; all interior finishing, trim, hanging of
doors and installation of windows and window trim
including all cabinet work called for in the plans.
Paragraph 6 of the contract provided:
''Millwork under this contract specifically
includes and covers the furnishing and installation of the following cabinet work, all cabinet
work shown on the plans in the following rooms:
Planting box in dining room, cabinets in kitchen
and day room, storage cabinets above laundry
equipment in utility room, shelving and hook
strips in all wardrobe closets in bedrooms, shelving for linen cabinets, bookcases in den, lavoratory counters in bath and shower rooms ready
for tile, counter tops by others. Five sets of
fruit storage shelves in storage room. Shelving
in broom closet off the day room. The above
named items of millwork are to be mill built or
equal as acceptable to the architect and all labor
and materials for these items and their inst.allations are to be furnished by this contractor, according to the terms of this agreement."
Defendants were to pay plaintiffs, for labor and
material furnished, the sum of $5,500.00 in four successive installments of $1000.00, $1, 750.00, $1,375.00 and
$1,375.00 as the work progressed. Exhibit A (R. 6-7)
Plaintiffs in their complaint (R. 1-5) alleged the
execution of the contract, the performance of the con2
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tract by plaintiff~, and that defendants had failed to
pay the la~t installment of $1,375.00. In addition, plaintiff~ alleged that they had perfonned certain specified
extra work of a Yalne of $185.00, and prayed for judgment of $1560.00 plus attorney fees and interest. The
emuplaint contained no allegation whatsoever that the
rontract, Exhibit A (R. 6-7) was not the actual and
con1plete agreement of the parties - the materiality
of which will appear later - except for the allegation
that the additional work previously mentioned was
done. In fact, plaintiffs relied upon the written contract for the definition of their rights against defendant. X or was there any prayer to change or modify
any of the terms of the contract.
Defendants' answer, ( R. 19-20) admitted the exeeution and terms of the contract, denied the contract
had been completely performed by the plaintiffs, admitted that the plaintiff had performed some extra
w-ork, and denied that the sum of $1560.00 was owed to
plaintiffs.
A pre-trial of issues was had but evidently the
court failed to pr~pare a pre-trial order, since none
appears in the files or records of the case. From the
record of the proceedings at the time of trial, it is apparent that the court, at the pretrial, limited the issues
of the case to the amount which might be owed to the
plaintiffs by the defendants under the contract and the
credits or offsets to which the defendants might be
entitled. (R. 29-30-31) At the time of the pre-trial it
was agreed that the defendantH should furnish plaintiffs
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with a statement as to what part of the payments called
for by the contract they would concede had not been
paid, what additional amount they would concede was
due to the plaintiffs by reason of the additional work
done by the plaintiffs and the items for which the defendants believed they should receive credit or be allowed an off-set. Plaintiffs were to furnish defendants
with a statement of the credits or allowances to which
they would concede defedants V\Tere entitled.
In accordance with the pre-trial order, defendants
furnished the statement required by which they agreed
that the last payment of the $1375.00 had not been paid
and that the plaintiffs had performed additional work
of the value of 185.00 (R. 152-153)
At the same time the defendants advised the plaintiffs they claimed a credit or off-set against such sums
for materials and labor furnished by defendant in connection with certain cabinets which should have been
furnshed by plaintiffs; for the failure of plaintiff to
construct certain items as agreed in the contract, to
wit, a swimming pool, a redwood fence and partitions
in a bath house; and for the faulty workmanship of
plaintiffs in laying the floors and installing the windows.
The defendants also advised the plaintiff that, at the
time of trial, they would amend their answer to include
a counterclaim against plaintiffs. (R. 22-23)
The amendment simply urged the same items by
way of counterclaim for which the defendants were
already claiming credit by way of off-set against the
claims of the plaintiffs. The court allowed the amend4
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ment. (R. 33) Plaintiffs filed a reply, (R. 24-25) in
which the plaintiffs for the first time alleged that the
contract on which they relied for recovery was not, in
fact. the contract entered into between the. parties. The
plaintiffs, \Yhile relying on the written contract for
the definition of their rights against defendants, sought
to avoid certain provisions of the contract and prayed
that the contract be reformed on the ground that "the
\Yord •materials' (in Paragraph 6 of the contract) was
incorporated in said sentence in error and unintentionally and said error was through inadvertance and mistake of the plaintiffs not noticed when said contract
was signed.'' No fraud or other ground for reformation were alleged.
Plaintiffs refused to concede that the defendants
were entitled to any credits or set-offs, contrary to
their agreement in the pre-trial, on the theory that the
introduction of the counterclaim changed the theory of
the case. (R. 30-34)
Plaintiffs did concede, however that under the terms
of the contract Exhibit A, (R. 6-7), as that contract was
written and not they wished it reformed, the defendant would be entitled to a credit of $2®.44 for materials
and labor furnished in the construction of the various
cabinets. (R. 34)
The original plans for the house (Exhibit B and
Exhibit 2) contemplated the construction of a swimming pool, a redwood fence, and three dressing rooms
in the garage of the house. (R. 22-23-28-29-53-54-7678-115) The plaintiff, Arnold Paulsen, who conducted
5
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all the negotiations for plaintiffs, admitted that the
redwood fence, the partitions in the bathhouse, and the
swimming pool were included on the plans. (R. 53-54)
He further admitted that his bid for the construction of
the house included the partitions in the bathhouse and
the redwood fence but asserts that the swimming pool
was not included. (R. 53-54) Evidence is uncontradicted
that the swimming pool - that is the construction of
forms for pouring concrete for the swimming pool - the redwood fence and the dressing rooms in the
garage were not constructed. (R. 44-56-78-80)
A qualified witness for the plaintiff testified that
the carpentry work in connection with the svvimming
pool would cost not less than $400.00. (R. 137) ·The
architect, LeRoy Johnson, who was called by the plaintiffs, admitted telling the defendants that they should
receive credit for $350.00 to $400.00 if the swimming
pool was not built. ( R. 82)
Plaintiffs' evidence of the amount to which they
should be entitled by reason of plaintiffs' failure to
construct partitions in the bathhouse was $40.00 (R.
107), and that the credit to which the defendant should
be entitled for failure to construct the redwood fence
was $108.00. (R. 112-13) The plaintiffs attempted to
urge some claimed additional work as an offset against
the cost of building the partitions in the bathhouse and
redwood fence. This evidence was correctly excluded
by the court (R. 92-93) sine~ plaintiffs were already
pleaded $185.00 for additional work, which the defendants had admitted.
6
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The plaintiffs admitted that they did not furnish
the materials or labor for certain cabinets specified
in paragraph 6 of the contract and concede, that under
a ~trict interpretation of the contract, the defendants
would be entitled to a credit of $280.44 for these items~
( R. 34) The plaintiffs sought to avoid paragraph 6 of
the contract on the grounds that this provision of the
contract was in error as to the furnishing of materials.
The record is void of any reason whatsoever why defendants should not receive some credit for the labor
on the cabinets which was not performed by ~plaintiffs
as provided in paragraph 6 of the contract.
The rest of the evidence, which will be discussed
in greater detail later on, went to the faulty workmanship of the plaintiffs for which the defendants claimed
a credit, such as, the faulty installation of the steel
doors in the front room of the house which the defendants paid $171.00 to have rehung after the doors
were improperly installed by plaintiffs; the improperly
finished hardwood floor which plaintiffs' witness, Carl
Hale, testified would cost a total of $520.00 to replace;
(R. 70-71) the incorrect installation of the steel windows
which plaintiffs admitted installing backwards, saying
that it didn't make any difference, which in the plaintiff's opinion damaged his house to the extent of $500.00;
and the failure of the plaintiffs to complete the house
by installation of hardware which the architect testified would amount to $20.00.
After presentation of the evidence the court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (R. 160-162)
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for the full amount of $1560.00 plus $25.00 attorney
fees, without making any allowances to the plaintiffs
whatsoever for any of the above-mentioned items. In
doing so the court committed error in the following
respects.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
1. The court erred in permitting plaintiffs to vary
the terms of a written contract by parole evidence.

2. The court erred in excluding the construction
specifications as an exhibit.
3. The court did not confine the evidence at the
trial to those issues outlined in the pre-trial agreement.
4. The judgment is contrary to the evidence.
POINT NO. I
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO
VARY THE TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONRACT BY PAROLE
EVIDENCE.

In arriving at its judgment the court granted to
plaintiffs all they prayed for and did not allow defendants anything by way of set-off or counterclaim.
Since it cannot be. denied that the plaintiff failed to
perform the contract, as that contract is written, in at
least four respects: 1. Plaintiffs failed to furnish the
materials and part of the labor for the construction of
the cabinets required by paragraph 6 of the contract;
2, Plaintiffs did not construct the forinings or footings
or for the swimming pool as contemplated by the plans;
and, 3, plaintiffs did not ·construct the bath partitions;
and, 4, plaintiffs did not construct the redwood fence

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sho·wn on the plans, it is apparent that the court did
not hold the plaintiff to the terms of the written contract, therefore, the court allowed the plaintiffs to
depart fron1 or to vary the terms of the written contract by his oral te~ti1nony.
In their reply, plaintiffs alleged that the last sentenee of paragraph 6 of the contract, hereinbefore
quoted, Exhibit A, (R. 6-7) which reads as follows:
''The above nan1ed items of millwork are to be millwork
or equal as acceptable to the architect and aU labor and
materials for these items and their installations are
to be furnished by this contractor, according to the
terms of this agreement," contains a mutual mistake
of fact in the "the words 'materials' was incorporated
in said sentence in ~rror and unintentionally and said
err?r was through inadvertance and mistake of the
plaintiff not noticed when said contract was signed.''
( R. 25) No other explanation or reason for modifying
the contract was given.
As to the swimming pool plaintiff merely alleges·
''Plaintiffs did not enter into a contract to furnish
carpentry labor for a swimming pool for defendants.''
(R. 25)
No allegation whatsoever was made concerning the
obligation to build bathhouses in the garage or a redwood fence.
It is the obligation of the parties seeking reformation to plead and prove his right to reformation. The
following appears in American Jurisprudence :
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''A court of equity cannot reform an instrument except on allegations which make o~t a case
for the equitable remedy asked. As 1n other
actions, all facts necessary to make out a case
must be pleaded." 45 Am. Jur. Page 644 Sec. 98.
''When the mistake is relied on as a ground
for reformation it must be charged distinctly, and
with precision. The pleading must show the particular mistake, how it occurred, and that it existed
at the time of the execution of the instrument in
question. In other words, the llleader should show
why the terms of the actual contract have been
left out or how the terms not agreed upon came
to be inserted. It must be distinctly alleged that
the mistake was eommon to most parties . . . ''
45 Am. Jur. 664 Sec. 100.
Commenting on the rule in Garner v. Thomas et al,
94 Utah 295 at Page 298, Justice Wolf quoting from a
Tennessee case, says :
''The pleader· must show how the mistake was
made, and show that he was without fault in the
matter."
Plaintiffs reply did not allege any error in the contract whatsoever as to the partitions in the bathhouse
and the redwood fence. As to the. swimming pool, plaintiffs merely alleged in their reply that plaintiffs did not
agree to furnish the carpentry labor for a swimming
pool stating no explanation whatsoever. Their allegations in regard to the materials plaintiffs were required
to furnish under paragraph 6 of the contract, that is,
''the said error occurred· through mistake and error of
the plaintiff,'' not only does not state a ground for ref or-
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mation but affinnatiYely pleads that the plaintiffs were
at fault or negligent in this Inatter.
Plaintiff not having alleged any ground for reformation, the court should not have permitted introduction
of any eYidence going to this point over the objections of
the defendants. (R. 39-40)
The plaintiffs based their cause of action against
the defendants upon a contract executed by the parties
on the 3rd day of November, 1950. The contract was
attached to and made a part of plaintiffs' complaint. No
where in plaintiffs' complaint did they allege any different contract than that that was set out in exhibit nor
did they pray for any reformation of any of the terms
of the contract. Upon the filing of the counterclaim of
the defendants, plaintiffs for the first time attempted
to vary the terms of the contract upon which they were
relying. But even then they failed to state or prove a
cause for reformation. There were no facts proven which
showed the contract to be anything other than the written
contract, Exhibit A. (R. 6-7) Even if said evidence
were admissable, the plaintiffs failed by their evidence
to sustain the necessary burden of proof to vary the
written contract.
In George v. Fritsch Loa;n a;nd Trust ComP'any, 69
.Utah 460, this court said:
"Written contracts will be reformed to express
the agreement of the parties, (only) where proof
of the mistake is clear, definite and convincing,
and where party seeking reformation is not guilty
of negligence in executing contracts or laches in
applying for reformation." (Italics ours)
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In Silne v. Harper, Utah, 222 P2d 571, 580 a suit to
reform a deed, the court quoting restatement· of the laws
of contracts:
"It is essential in order to obtain a decree recinding or reforming a written converance, con. tract assignment or discharge for m1stake that
the facts necessary for allowance of remedy shall
be proved by clear and convincing evi~ence and not
by a mere preponderance.''
Quoting Justice in the case of Greener v. Greener,
Utah 212 P2d 194, 214, the court continues :
"But for a matter to be clear and convincing
to a particular mind it must at least have reached
the point where there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. A mind which was of the opinion that it
was convinced and yet which entertained, not a
slight, but reasonable doubt as to the correctness
of its conclusion, would seem to be in a state of
confusion. ''
It is not enough for the plaintiffs to show what
they claim the contract to be, they must show that both
parties understand the contract as they claim.
''Indeed, when no question of fraud, bad faith,
or inequitable conduct is involved and the right
to reform an instrument is based solely on a mistake, it is necessary that the mistake be mutual,
and that both parties understand the contract as
the complaint or petition alleges it ought to have
been, and as in fact it was except for the mistake;
and this is so whether the mistake is one of fact
or law~ or one of law and fact mixed. Otherwise
stated a unilateral mistake is not ordinarily
ground for reformation, the remedy in that case
thereof being recision.'' 45 Am. J ur. 617, Sec. 55.
12
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Let us now exan1ine the testimony as to the agreement between the parties. The plaintiff, Arnold Paulsen,
who had been engaged in the cantracting business for
twelYe year~ (R. 36) was given a set of plans on which
to figure the carpentry labor (R. 38). Those plans clearly
showed the inclusion of a swimming pool, bathhouse i.fi
the garage, and a redwood fence. Paulsen admits examiuing these plans before he submitted his bid and submitting his bid on the basis of these plans. (R. 49-50) His
bid was ''Titten on a piece of paper and given to LeRoy
Johnson, the architect, (R. 41) to have the contract
drawn. (R. 5±-55) He further admitted reading the contract before signing it and that paragraph 6 of the contract, relating to the furnishing of materials for the
cabinets, was in the contract at the time he read it. (R.
54-55)
LeRoy Johnson, the architect and a witness for the
plaintiff, testified that he made a preliminary estimate
of what it would cost to have the carpentry work done
on the residence. This estimate came to $3400.00 for
the carpentry work and $1700.00 for the cabinets, a
total of $5100.00. He testified that his estimate included
the furnishing of steel cabinets and millwork. (R. 79)
The actual contract awarded to the plaintiffs was for
$5500.00 (R. 79) It is fair to assume that the actual contract was in accordance with the estimate prepared by
the architect, LeRoy Johnson. Johnson further testified
that the contract was prepared by his secretary from a
rough draft given to him by the plaintiff, Paulsen. (R.
70). Paragraph 6 was in the contract and was in accord13
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ance with the standard form of specifications of American Institute of Architects. (R. 71) He agreed that a
swimming pool, redwood fence, and partitions in the
bathhouse were always included in the plans and that
anything which appears in the contract was put there
.by Mr. Paulsen or Mr. Johnson and not by the defendants,
:M:r. Coombs. (R. 80)
Mr. Coombs testified that the architect, LeRoy Johnson, gave him a preliminary estimate of $3400.00 for the
carpentry labor and $1700.00 for the millwork including
steel cabinets. (R. 114) That there was always a swimming pool, redwood fence and bath partitions included
in the contract. (R. 115) The contract was prepared by
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Paulsen. Coombs did not see the
contract until the time of signing. Paulsen told Mr.
Coombs he had read the contract and signed the same in
his presence. (R. 134) There is absolutely no evidence
on which to base a finding the swimming pool was not
included in the plans except the unsupported denial of
the plain tiffs. There is further absolutely no evidence
that Coombs did not understand the contract included
the material and labor for the cabinet work, the redwood
fence, the partitions in the bathhouses, and the construction of a swimming pool. About the most that can be
said for plaintiffs' position is that they failed t~ note or
understand the terms of the contract.
"Equity aids the vigilant, and will not extend
its aid, by reforming an instrument, to one who
has been guilty of culpable negligence, especially
where the change might injuriously effect the
rights or status of other parties to the instru14
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rnent or of innocent third persons." 45 Am. Jur.
Page 631, Sec. 78.
''In accordance with the principal just stated,
it is the duty of a party to an instrument to ascertain its true meaning and ~urport and to understand its contents ·before affixing his signature;
and if he fails to discharge this duty, he is guilty
of negligence which will ordinarily deprive him
of relief by way of reformation on the ground of
mistake. At least he is presumptably guilty of
gross negligence and the burden of proof rests
upon him to rebuct that presumption.'' 45 Am.
Jur. Page 632, Sec. 79.
In Larson v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company,
38 Utah 130, 135 an action on a contract to carry certain
goods, the objection was made to one of the provisions
of the contract that the other party had not read that
part of the contract. This court said:
''There was no issue in this case that the
contract was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. The contract was entered into as contracts
frequently are by one of the parties omitting or
neglecting to read it before signing it. That a
party must be bound by the terms of the contract
which he did not read is elementary and in the
nature of things must be so.''
Not only did plaintiffs not plead or prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the contract should be
reformed in any particular, but the evidence substantiates
the written contract and shows it to contain the intention
of the parties. If the plaintiffs did, in fact, misunderstand the terms of the agreement, as they claim, this
misunderstanding was peculiar to them and not common
15
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to both parties and resulted from their own gross negligence in failing to read and understand what was plain
and obvious. The contract is written in clear and concise terms. No claim is made that plaintiffs were ignorant persons, were defrauded or were taken advantage
of by defendants.
To allow plaintiffs now to vary the terms of the
contract is to vilify the sanctity of the written instrument. They should not have been allowed to do so at
the trial of this action.
POINT NO. II
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS AS AN EXHIBIT.

Having thrown the door open to oral testimony,
although improperly, the court failed to admit the construction specifications in the evidence, which specifications. would have done more than any other evidence to
show the actual agreement between the parties. The
testimony of the plai.ntiff, Arnold Paulsen, was that he
had been in the construction business for twelve year::;.
( R. 50) He knew as a general rule an architect prepares
specifications in connection with a construction project
and that there were probably specifications in this instance. (R. 50) But that he did not concern himself with
those specifications. (R. 51) The architect, LeRoy
Johnson, testified that an ordinary construction contract, consists of plans, specifications and the contract
itself. (R. 72) LeRoy Johnson, the architect on page 74
of the record, identified the particular specifications
offered by the defendant as the specifications which were

16
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prepared in conection with a construction of the defendants' hmne. He identified page 13 of the document, the
specifications proferred by the defendants, as that part
of the specifications which applied to the carpentry labor
which plaintiffs were to perform. It is submitted that
the contract could not haYe been thorughly understood
by the court without having before it a copy of the
specifications in addition to the agreement itself and the
plans. It i~ further submitted that the specifications
might have cleared up any question-if indeed there was
any question-as to what was actually intended to be
the agreement between the parties. As has been said,
the architect testified that the proposed exhibit was the
specification covering this house and that the construction agreement ordinarily included the agreement, plans
and specifications. The plaintiffs were thoroughly
familiar with the fact that the agreement was made up
of these three items. If plaintiffs did not examine the
specifications, as they claim, they had every opportunity
to do so and should not now be heard to deny that the
specifications were not a part of their agree1nent.
POINT NO. III
THE COURT DID NOT CONFINE THE EVIDENCE OF
THE TRIAL TO THOSE ISSUES OUTLINED IN THE PRETRIAL AGREEMENT.

Although there was no pre-trial order prepared
by the court, there was an agreement to confine the
trial to the issue of how much was owed by the defendants to the plaintiff and how much the defendants
should be allowed as credit or by way of offset against
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that amount. The court, upon trial, did not confine the
plaintiffs to those issues agreed upon at the pre-trial
conference.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that a.t the time of the pre-trial conference:
''The court shall make an order which recites
the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and agreements
made by the parties a.s to any of the matters
considered, and which limits the issues for trial
to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
controls the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest
injustice. ''
This rule was adopted from the federal rules of
practice and procedure and the part quoted above is
exactly the same as the , federal rule. 28 USCA 623.
While not controlling, the inte~pretation given to the
federal rule may be us~d as a guide in defining the
interpretation which should be given to the rule by this
court.
Speaking of the rule, Baron and Holtzoff (Federal
Practice and Procedure, Baron and Holtzoff Vol. 1,
P. 951) says:
"The purpose of this rule is to eliminate unnecessary issues, analyze and settle the pleadings
by amendments if desirable or necessary, eliminate matters of proof by admissions or stipulations, limit the number of expert witnesses,
ascertain whether issues in a jury case may be
referred to a master for findings and discuss in
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a conference preli1ninary to trial other matters
which may expedite the disposition of the action.''
In a note which appears on the same page the following appears:
•' Of this rule, District Judge Laws said before
the American Bar Association: 'One of the vital,
if not outstanding advantages of pre-trial procedure is to take the trial of action out of the
realm of surprise and maneuvering, whereby unwary counsel might see the just cause of his
client lost. It may be romantic and charming to
watch the skillful trial lawyer as he lies in wait
to pounce upon an uninformed and less skillful
counsel, but the results frequently are not just.' "
10 Ford L. Rev. 76.
Properly used, the rule is designed to expedite the
trial of lawsuits by narrowing the issues of the lawsuit
to those parts which are in dispute eliminating those
where there is no argument. After the issues have been
so narrowed, counsel may then direct his preparation and
evidence to those issues which have been so defined.
However, the rule which was designed to simplify and
aid the litigants and the court to arrive at a speedy
and justly determination of the issues, can be a very
damaging instrument when improperly administered by
the court.
In this case, for example, the defendants were re·
quired to lay their cards upon the table while the plaintiffs were permitted to depart from the issues and present evidence upon issues which have not been considered at the pre-trial and for which the plaintiff had
had no advance opportunity to prepare.
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The plaintiffs cite as justification for this departure
·that the defendants were permitted to file a coun~r
claim at the time of trial. However, they knew at the
time of pre-trial whether the contract (R. 67) represented the actual agreement of the parties. The introduction of the counterclaim did not effect the intention
of the parties and make what was true at the time of
the pre-trial, untrue at the time of the trial. Moreover,
the plaintiffs made no request to the court to modify
the pre-trial agreement. Nor did the counterclaim orfered by the defendants change the issue or go outside
the issues agreed upon by the pre-trial agreement as the
issue before the court was still what amount was owed
to the plaintiffs and what allowance the defendants
should receive a:s credit or offset or by way of counterclaim or otherwise against the amounts owed to the
plaintiffs. .The same evidence would have been admissible even _had the counterclaim not been filed.
POI~T

NO. IV

THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.

Passing for the moment the errors of the court
in either allowing or excluding certain evidence, the
results reached by the trial ·court was not justified by
the evidence before the court. In order to illustrate this,
_let us consider the testimony on the various items which
came ·before the court. When asked on page 53 of the
record if the plans included a redwood fence running
adjacent to the swimming pool Mr. Paulsen, plaintiffs'
chief witness, answered, "yes". When asked the same
question in regard to the partitions in the bathhouse he
20
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gave the same answer. (R. 54) When asked if he built
the redwood fence he replied "I didn't". When asked
··you didn't install the partition in the bathhouse 1'' he
answered, "That is tru~." (R. 54) When asked whether
or not he understood he was to build the redwood fence
and bath partitions he replied· "that is correct." (R.
56) And when asked on page 57 of the record as to what
items he admitted that he hadn't built the plaintiff replied ••the redwood fence and ·the bath partitions."
The architect, LeRoy Johnson, testified that the redwood fence and the partitions were contemplated by
the agreement. (R. 80) Plaintiffs sought to offset this
by claiming to have done some additional work in its
place which evidence was excluded by the court for the
reason that the plaintiffs had already alleged that he
had done additional work and was asking $185.00 for
the same which the defendants had admitted. The only
evidence offered as to the amount which the defendants
should be allowed for these two items was that given
by defendants witness '' Hary Neibuhr''·. He testified
that it would cost $40.00 to build the hath partitions
(R. 107) and $108.00 to build the redwood fence shown
by the plans. (R. 109-112). Yet the court allowed defendants nothing for plaintiffs' failure to construct these
two items.
In regard to the swimming pool the plaintiff, Arnold
Paulsen, agreed that there was a swimming pool included in the plans on which he submitted his bid. (R. 53)
Plaintiffs' witness, LeRoy Johnson, when asked whether
or not he had told the defendants they should re·ceive
21
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a credit of $350.00 to $400.00 for the swimming pool if
iit wasn't built replied "I told him the value of carpentry labor was $350.00 to $400.00, if it wasn't built". (R.
82) The defendant, Co:ombs, corroborated LeRoy John. son in this regard and testified that he was told he
should receive an allowance of· $400.00 for the deletion
of the swimming pool. (R. 115) Under paragraph 7 of
the agreement (R. 6-7} it was provided: "Exception
and changes to ite1ns called for in the plans are to remain the privilege of the owner. Any such exception or
changes are to receive a suitable allowance or wn additional charge as the case may be, said allowances and/or
extras to be determined by a conference between the
architect, owner and this contractor." Plaintiffs witness, Harry Neibuhr, testified that the cost of constructing the forms for the installation of the swimming pool would have been $400.00. (R. 137) Yet the
court allowed the defendants nothing for the elimination of this i tern.
Under the terms of the written agreement the
plaintiffs were to construct and furnish the labor for
the k1tchen cabinets. Mr. Coombs testified that he paid
$503.01 for the kitchen cabinets (R. 117), Exhibit 4.
Mr. Tibbals, attorney for the plaintiffs, conceded that
the defendants should have been allowed $98.24 for this
item. (R. 34) Arthur Christiansen, plaintiffs' own witness, estimated the cost of furnishing the materials for
the kitchen cabinets at $110.23 (R. 146) Yet the court
failed to allow the defendants any credit for this item.
In regard to the planter box defendant Coombs
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testified that the desig·n of the planter box was changed
at the ~nggestion of the architect and that the planter.
box ·was made at the mill at the suggestion of the architect, Thlr. LeRoy Johnson, and the plaintiff, Mr. Paulsen, in accordance with the terms of paragraph 7 of
the agreen1ent. (R. 119-6-7) The plaintiff testified that
the cost of the planter box was $186.94 plus the lubers
or a total of $230.96 (R. 121-123) The architect agreed
that the changes in the planter box had been discussed
and that the planter box was constructed at a mill
upon his suggestion (R. 85-86) Counsel for the plaintiff
conceded he should be allowed $48.00 for this item which
included $16.00 labor (R. 34) and his witness Christiansen estimated this item at $44.46 for labor and material
(R. 147) yet the court allowed plaintiffs no credit for
this item.
Again in regard to the cabinets in the study, the
plaintiffs testified that this item cost $293.00 (R. 128)
Attorney for the plaintiff, Mr. Tibbals, conceded that
the item was worth $45.04 including $16.00 (R. 34) for
labor and his witness Christianson placed the value of
the item at $44.64. (R. 147) Yet the court allowed defendants no credit for this item.
In regard to the cabinets in the utility room and
bath rooms which were constructed by the plaintiffs,
plaintiffs' evidence as to the cost of materials was
$405.06. (Exhibit 3) Counsel for the plaintiffs conceded that the materials would have cost $53.04 (R. 34)
and his witness Christianson placed them at $48.38 for
the bath and shower room (R. 147) and $23.85 for the
23
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utility room. (R. 147) Again the court did not allow
the plaintiffs any credit in this regard.
The only evidence as to the hardware which had
not been installed in home of the defendants was that
produced by the plaintiffs themselves. Paulsen testified
that the hardware had not yet been installed. (R. 56)
He stated it would cost $3.00 to install the hardware.
(R. 65) His other witness, the architect, first stated it
would cost $20.00 and later $10.00 to install the hardallowance was made by the court for
ware. ( R. 73)
this item.
Lastly, we come to the items which go to faulty
workmanship of the plaintiffs. There, can be no queation that the windows were not properly installed and
the plaintiff himself so admitted although he seeks to
litgate this by saying that it did not make any difference. ( R. 59-60) When asked if the windows were installed backwards the architect answered, ''that could
be a matter of conjecture'' and then went on to admit
that the cranks on one side were on the outside and on
the other were in the middle and that it was more
desirable to have both cranks in the middle. He further
admitted that the ~crank had to be taken off of one
side and put on the other to make the windows match.
(R. 83-84) This was done rather than changing the
window about since it would have been very expensive
to have changed the window, the plastering having already been done. (R. 60) The defendant, Coombs, who
has been engaged in the sale of real estate for number
of years testified that in his opinion his house was dam-

No
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aged to the extent of $500.00 by the improper installation of these windows. (R. 105)
In regard to the hanging of steel of the doors the
plaintiff Paulsen admitted that under paragraph 5 of
his contract he was obligated to install the windows
( R. 58) and that the door installed on the west side of
the living room was hard to slide back and forth after
he had installed it. Coombs testified that he was obligated to pay $171.00 to have this steel door rehung
(R. 116) and yet .the court allowed him nothing for
this item.
Coming at last to the floors the plaintiff contended
that there was not a proper selection of flooring made
and that the floors were very poorly laid. The plaintiff,
Paulsen, admitted that under his contract he was responsible for laying the floors. (R. 67) The architect,
Johnson, admitted that during the construction of the
house he may have told Paulsen to make a better selection of flooring (R. 85) and the plaintiffs' witness Carl
Hale who sanded and finished floors for 27 years testified that the floors in this house were improperly laid
and that it would cost $240.00 to lay them properly
and $280.00 to refinish them or a total of $520.00.
(R. 98-99)
Thus it can be seen that there is no question but
that the plaintiffs did not furnish any of the material
required by paragraph 6 of the written contract. Even
foregoing the material, it is further evident that much
of the labor which was contemplated should be performed on the cabinets by them was performed by others.
25
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It is further evident that many items such as the redwood fence, the partitions in the bathhouse, and the
swimming pool were eliminated entirely. And while
there may be some 0onflict in the evidence as to the
quality of the workmanship, there can be no question
but that some of the work was improperly done. Yet,
in spite of this evidence, the court rendered a judgment
for the full amount of the contract price to the plaintiff
without giving any allowances whatsoever to the defendants for the materials which were not furnished,
the labor which . was not performed and the items which
were improperly installed or where the quality of workmanship did not measure up to standard. The conclusion
is inescapable that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
a judgment for the entire amount and that, therefore,
the judgment reached by the court was incorrect.

CONCLUSION
This case may be summed up as follows:
The defendants were desirous of constructing a home.
Por this purpose they retained an architect, who prepared plans and specifications and made preliminary
estimates of the cost of the home including the carpentry work, which was estimated at $5100.00. Plaintiffs
were requested to submit a bid to cover the carpentry
work which they did. Their hid to do this part of the
work was $5500.00. The written agreement, which is
the subject of this action, was prepared by the arc~i
tect from a rough .draft of the hid submitted by the
·plaintiffs. The agreement was signed by or on behalf
26
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of the parties after a careful consideration of the provisions of the agTeement. At least, plaintiffs, who have
been engaged in the construction business for 12 years,
had eYery opportunity for a careful consideration of
the contract, although they may have been negligent in
informing themselves of its contents.
The plaintiffs did not comply with the terms of the
agreement in many respects. They did not furnish the
Inaterials for any of the cabinets, as required by the
contract. They did not construct, that is, furnish the
labor for many of the cabinets. The swimming pool,
redwood fence and bath partitions called for by the
plans, which was part of the agreement, were eliminated.
The quality of the workmanship done by the plaintiffs
was not up to standard.
Plaintiffs only defense was an attempt to v,ary
the terms of the written agreement into which they
had entered and the only basis advanced for doing this
was that they failed to read and understand the contract. Yet the trial court allowed plaintiffs to vary the
terms of the written contract by oral evidence and
denied the introduction of the building specifications,
which was part of and would have exiJJained the agreement, into evidence. The court disregarded all the allowances or credits to which the defendants were entitled, and entered judgment for the plaintiffs for the
full contract price.
If the court were to uphold this judgment the court
would be in effect saying that a party, who has entered
into a written agreement with no unfair advantage
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having been taken of him and every opportunity to
exa~ine and inform himself of the provisions of that
contract, may later defeat the rights of other party to
the contract by the simple expedient of denying certain
parts of the contract while relying upon other parts
of the same contract for a definition of his rights. The
sanctity of the written agreement, which heretofore has
only been modified upon the clearest and most convincing kind of proof, would disappear and the advantage
be given to those who seek to avoid their solemn obligations.
It is submitted that the court should order a new
trial in this rna tter.
Re81>ectfully submitted,

by Don J. Hanson
Rex J. Hanson
Edwin B. Cannon
Ernest F. Baldwin
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